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Abstract
An increasing number of cybersecurity incidents
prompts organizations to explore alternative security
solutions, such as threat intelligence programs. For
such programs to succeed, data needs to be collected,
validated, and recorded in relevant datastores. One
potential source supplying these datastores is an
organization’s security incident response team.
However, researchers have argued that these teams
focus more on eradication and recovery and less on
providing feedback to enhance organizational security.
This prompts the idea that data collected during security
incident investigations may be of insufficient quality for
threat intelligence analysis.
While previous discussions focus on data quality
issues from threat intelligence sharing perspectives,
minimal research examines the data generated during
incident response investigations. This paper presents
the results of a case study identifying data quality
challenges in a Fortune 500 organization’s incident
response team. Furthermore, the paper provides the
foundation for future research regarding data quality
concerns in security incident response.

1. Introduction
Cybersecurity incidents continue to plague
organizations around the world [1-4]. According to the
2017 SANS Institute Incident Response Survey [1],
87% of respondents detected at least one security
incident in the past year. Similarly, the United Kingdom
(UK) Government’s 2017 Cyber Security Breaches
Survey [2] reported that 46% of all UK business
identified at least one security breach or attack in the
previous twelve months. These security attacks and
breaches come at a tremendous financial cost. For
example, the Ponemon Institute estimates that economic
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losses attributed to security incidents and breaches cost
United States-based organizations an average of $7.35
million in 2016 [3].
The increasing number of security attacks and data
breaches fuels regulatory legislation and directives.
These directives mandate that organizations implement
mechanisms to protect, recover from and investigate
attacks that become security incidents. For example,
Article 32.1(c) within the European Union’s General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) specifies that
organizations must have “the ability to restore the
availability and access to personal data in a timely
manner in the event of a physical or technical
incident” [5]. Similarly, in the United States, forty-eight
states and the District of Columbia have enacted
legislation requiring organizations to notify individuals
when security breaches involve personally identifiable
information [6].
In an effort to assist organizations with legal and
regulatory obligations, several institutions, such as the
National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) [7], the European Network and Information
Security Agency (ENISA) [8] and the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) [9] have
published guidance on security incident investigation
and recovery techniques. The final phase of many
security incident response approaches is the ‘feedback’
or ‘follow-up’ phase [7, 10, 11]. It is in this phase where
an organization is expected to learn from a security
incident with the aim of improving its overall security
posture [10]. Within incident response, security incident
learning typically accomplishes this through a series of
formal reports, meetings and presentations to
management after the closure of an incident
investigation [7]. Lessons learned from a security
investigation can include information about
enhancements to existing security controls along with
analyzing the necessity of changes to existing security
incident response processes and procedures [12].
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For an organization to learn more about the
underlying causes of a security incident, investigators
require access to detailed information [13-15]. In fact,
ENISA contends that one of the critical factors
influencing the success of an organization’s security
incident response team is the quality of actionable
information at the disposal of the team [13]. However,
researchers have observed that many organizations are
more focused on eradication and recovery and less on
security incident learning [16-18]. As a result, there is
the potential that the quality of data derived from
security investigations may be unfit for in-depth security
incident learning. In practice, poor quality data
produced by a security incident response process can
also impact other aspects of cybersecurity within an
organization [19].
In the past few years, researchers have argued that
security incident response teams can provide much more
functionality to an organization than just minimizing the
damage from a security incident [19-21]. One particular
function that has emerged is the role of a security
incident response team within an organization’s security
threat intelligence program [19-21]. The primary
objective of such a program is to produce evidencebased knowledge about risks and threats, which can then
be used to make informed security decisions within an
organization [22]. However, for such a security effort to
be effective, it must be provided with datasets of
sufficient quality [19]. Providing a threat intelligence
program with either inaccurate, inconsistent or outdated
information can produce poor quality intelligence [19].
From a threat intelligence perspective, security
response teams provide organizations with an internal
source of information. The data produced by these teams
can include information like command and control IP
addresses, low-level indicators of compromise, and
malware hash values [13, 20]. Based on the increasing
number of incidents, the importance of information
from quality data sources, regulatory activity, and issues
around eradication and recovery prompts the hypothesis
that organizations need to enhance the quality of data
generated during security incident response
investigations. The proposed hypothesis raises the
following research questions:
• What information is produced by a real-world
security incident response team?
• Does a security incident response team face
challenges when attempting to collect and
document data during a security incident
response investigation? If so, can these
challenges be identified?
The contribution of this paper is a detailed case study
examining the quality of data generated by a security

incident response team within a Fortune 500 Financial
organization. The case study encompasses a document
analysis involving security investigation records, and
interviews conducted with the organization’s security
incident response team. The remainder of this paper is
structured as follows. Section 2 discusses relevant
research related to security incident response and
security threat intelligence. Section 3 describes the
research methodology and introduces the case study.
Section 4 describes the case study findings. Section 5
concludes the work conducted and presents ideas for
future research.

2. Related Work
A growing number of researchers argue that security
threat intelligence programs are becoming a
fundamental component of an organization’s broader
security agenda [20, 23, 24]. McMillan summarizes
security threat intelligence as evidence-based
knowledge about threats, which can be used to make
informed security decisions within an organization [22].
Brewer [25] adds that the objective of security threat
intelligence is to deliver information, at the right time,
with the correct and appropriate context, in order to
reduce the amount of time it takes an organization to
detect and respond to a security threat.
Mattern et al. [26] argue that organizations need to
consider multiple sources of information for its security
threat intelligence program. These sources can include
data generated outside of an organization such as
governmental projects, open source, and publiclyavailable databases, as well as commercial
providers [21]. However, data for a security threat
intelligence program can also be generated internally
within an organization [10, 12, 21]. For example,
network monitors, host-based indicators, and an
organization’s security incident response team [10, 12,
21]. The purpose of this team is to minimize the effects
of an incident and manage an organization’s return to an
acceptable security posture [14]. However, this team can
also contribute to an organization’s security threat
intelligence program by conducting detailed
investigations, identifying root-causes associated with
security events and incidents and producing actionable
information [13]. This actionable information can
include rogue IP addresses, malware metadata, and
indicators of compromise [13, 20]. This information can
also be of interest to regional and national Computer
Emergency Response Teams [21, 27].
Regardless of the source, for data to be useful in a
security threat intelligence program, it must be timely,
actionable and relevant so that it can assist
decisionmakers [26]. Previous research has focused on
the quality of data in various security threat intelligence
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platforms [19, 28, 29]. Sillaber et al. [19] conducted a
study that involved interviewing stakeholders
responsible for security operations within large
organizations. The purpose of the study is to investigate
data quality challenges in threat intelligence sharing
platforms. One of the findings from their research is that
manually-entered information is very susceptible to data
quality issues due to limited data entry checks. Sillaber
et al. [19] go on to suggest that organizations implement
automated data quality error checks for both internal and
external threat intelligence sources. In concert with
these findings, Al-Ibrahim et al. [29] proposed and
evaluated various data quality dimensions for security
threat intelligence platforms. These dimensions
included correctness, relevance, utility, and uniqueness,
which were then evaluated through an empirical case
study using real-world data from antivirus scans [29].
Separately, Dandurand and Serrano [28] proposed
eleven requirements concerning the sharing of threat
intelligence. However, none of these requirements
concerned the quality of data.
In response to a growing security threat,
organizations are examining different security incident
response approaches. Typically, these approaches
consist of six phases [11, 12, 30]: preparation, which
leads to the detection of an incident, followed by its
containment which, in turn, allows security incident
response teams to eradicate, recover and then,
potentially, provide feedback information into the
preparation phase. Although the literature has focused
on the technical practices for implementing these phases
within organizations, researchers have also identified
that many organizations appear to find it difficult to
apply these approaches [18, 31-33]. The implementation
difficulty is apparent in various case studies undertaken
within organizations.
Hove et al. [31] studied three large organizations
with the purpose of examining the security incident
handling plans and procedures within the studied
organizations. Hove et al. [31] identified that based on
best practices, many of the organizations were missing
procedures. For example, in two of the organizations,
security incident reporting procedures were not
established while the other organization did not appear
to have enough staff to respond to incidents
efficiently [31]. Grispos et al. [34] studied how
employees within an organization identify and report
security incidents, based on the process that exists
within the organization. The results of this study
indicated that there are opportunities to improve security
incident recognition and report generation within the
organization, including education initiatives on ‘what to
do’ and ‘when to do it’ in regard to incidents [34].
Grimes [32] argued that most security incident
response models have become outdated and no longer

support organization’s efforts to respond to security
incidents. Werlinger et al. [33] support these arguments
and add that security incident handlers often need to
develop their own tools to perform specific tasks during
investigations. Tan et al. [18] focused on factors which
influenced when an organization conducts an actual
investigation, once a security problem is detected. As
part of their case study, Tan et al. [18] reported that their
studied organization had no precise definition for the
term ‘security incident’ and as a result, incident handlers
did not realize what security problems were actually
‘incidents’. Tan et al. [18] found that this problem
decreased the overall response time to an actual
incident. While previous research has examined data
quality challenges in security threat intelligence sharing
platforms and the challenges of implementing security
incident response processes within organizations,
minimal research investigates the quality of data
generated during a security incident response
investigation.

3. Research Method
To empirically evaluate the quality of data generated
during and after security incident response
investigations, an exploratory case study was
undertaken within a Fortune 500 Financial
organization [35]. The benefit of conducting
exploratory case studies is that they assist researchers to
understand problems in real-world contexts, along with
identifying future areas of research [35]. The case study
was conducted between May and August 2013. The
name of the organization is being withheld to ensure
organizational anonymity. Therefore, the names of
corporate documents and processes have been altered,
and the results of data collected in the organization are
presented anonymously. Maintaining organizational
anonymity helps attain sensitive material, while creating
an environment that is conducive to the presentation of
this information.
The case study utilizes a mixed method approach to
the collection of data [35]. During the case study, data
was collected through an analysis of relevant security
incident response documentation, internal security
incident response investigation records, and through
interviews with individuals within the organization.
This data collection was undertaken in three phases.
The first phase involved analyzing relevant security
incident response documentation. The analysis was
performed to determine how management expects
security incident response investigations to be
conducted within the organization, as well as what
information should be recorded during investigations.
The primary author was given access to the
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organization’s internal documentation repository, which
was examined to identify and analyze documents related
to security incident response processes, within the
organization. These documents are available to all
individuals within the organization’s Information
Security Incident Response (ISIR) team. Materials,
which were considered sensitive, confidential and only
available to management, were outside the scope of the
analysis. The documents used in the exploratory case
study were all signed-off by management before being
stored in the document repository. The documents were
analyzed using theme analysis, which allows a
researcher to examine a variety of topics within a set of
documents [35, 36]. In this case, the topics examined are
relevant to security incident response settings.
The second phase of data collection involved the
organization’s security incident response database. The
purpose of this analysis was twofold. First, it was used
to examine if security investigations are managed and
handled as per documented processes within the
organization. Second, the database analysis was used to
investigate the quality of data stored in the
organization’s security investigation records. For this
analysis, the investigation records were examined
from the perspective of four data quality
dimensions: accuracy, timeliness, completeness, and
consistency [37]. For the purpose of this research,
accuracy is concerned with the difference between the
correct information required to be documented in the
investigation record and the information actually
documented by the incident handlers. Timeliness refers
to information that is in error because it is outdated and
differs from the original value. Completeness is
concerned with ensuring that no information is missing,
while consistency implies that some form of standard
exists throughout the information values. These
dimensions have previously been used to examine the
quality of data within information systems [37]. All the
investigation records stored in the database were made
available by the organization and are included in the
analysis.
The third phase of data collection utilized semistructured interviews with practitioners in the
organization. The purpose of the interviews was to
identify and explore challenges related to conducting
security incident response investigations in the
organization, along with examining information
gathering throughout the overall response process. The
interview instrument consisted of both open-ended and
closed questions, which were derived from themes
identified within industrial white-papers and academic
research related to security incident response. To
mitigate researcher bias regarding reliability and
viability, the interview instrument was validated by two
information security professionals [35]. Validation was

only conducted once due to time constraints. The
interview instrument was approved by the University of
Glasgow Ethics Committee.
Initially, interviews were conducted with three
individuals identified through the organization’s
security incident response process as the ‘primary
incident handlers’. A further twelve individuals were
then identified and interviewed based on answers from
the initial respondents’ interviews. All fifteen
individuals have at some point, been involved in the
investigation and handling of a security incident within
the organization. All responses to individual questions
were initially recorded by hand and then digitally
recorded soon after the interview completion, typically
within an hour. The results were then examined by hand
to identify trends, patterns, and anomalies.
The scope of this research is restricted from the
following perspectives. This research consists of a
single case study in a Fortune 500 Financial
organization based in the United Kingdom. Hence,
factors potentially impacting the case study include
local,
national
and
international
regulatory
requirements, along with societal and organizational
cultural issues. It should also be noted that the primary
researcher was embedded in the organization for several
months as-well-as being the primary data collector for
this investigation.

3.1. Information Security Incident Response
(ISIR) Team
The organization’s Information Security Incident
Response (ISIR) team is an ad-hoc team of security
incident handlers. This team facilitates the identification
and assignment of actions required to prevent the
recurrence of issues that are deemed to be or contribute
to a security incident. The ISIR team follows a
customized security incident handling approach. The
approach comprises four phases: 1) incident detection
and reporting; 2) recording, classification, and
assignment; 3) investigation and resolution; and 4)
incident closure.
The incident detection and reporting phase is
concerned with the reporting of a security incident to the
ISIR team. The reporting of an incident can come from
one of the following sources: a direct request from
senior management within the organization; a request
from a member or management of the Information
Security unit; a request from the Legal Services unit; or
a request from the Human Resources department within
the organization. The ISIR team can also be alerted
about potential incidents by automated methods such as
intrusion detection systems and data loss prevention
systems.
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During the recording, classification and assignment
phase, the ISIR team will determine if a security
incident really exists. If the incident is security-related,
an investigation record is created in the ISIR team
database. An incident handler is then appointed, and the
team agree on the problem statement and the incident
classification. Depending on the type and impact of the
security incident, different stakeholders could be
involved in the subsequent management and
investigation. For example, if the security incident is
determined to have a regulatory impact, a governance
process is invoked together with the organization’s risk
unit, although the ISIR team still manages the incident.
The investigation and resolution phase of the process
identifies the evidence and information that is required
to conduct a security investigation. At this point, the
ISIR team holds an incident meeting where the rootcause is established, and remedy actions associated with
the incident are assigned to individuals. These
individuals are expected to fulfill their actions and
update the incident handler upon their completion.
The final phase, incident closure, involves two
stages. First, relevant stakeholders are notified that all
assigned actions have been completed and the security
incident record is updated to reflect the closure of the
incident. The second stage requires that the incident
handler stores any findings and lessons learned acquired
from the incident in the ISIR team database. At this
point, the security incident is considered closed.

3.2. ISIR Team Database
Security investigation records are stored in the
Information Security Incident Response (ISIR) team
database, which is hosted on an IBM Lotus Notes server
within the organization. Within this database, individual
security investigation records are stored as separate
documents. Each document includes a copy of the
security investigation record template, as shown in
Figure 1 – ISIR Record Template.

The investigation record template consists of
twenty-two (22) fields, divided into three parts (labeled
as Parts A through C in Figure 1). These labels have
been added to the record template to aid with the
discussion below. Part A of the template prompts
incident handlers to record information concerning the
reported date and time of the security incident. The third
field in this section called ‘Duration’, is used to
document how long a particular security investigation
took to complete within the organization.
Part B of the template concerns contact details about
the individual who is managing and handling the
investigation within the ISIR team. Recorded
information includes the incident handler’s name and
job title; the name of their department and its physical
location; their telephone and mobile phone numbers;
email address and fax number.
Part C provides fields where incident handlers are
expected to document information about the
investigation itself. Although no confirmation is
provided in the record template or within the ISIR
process, the ‘Date’ and ‘Time’ fields within this section
appear to be used to document the initial start date and
time of the investigation. The purpose of the ‘Incident
Type’ and ‘Incident Location’ fields is to document the
type of investigation and its location in the organization.
The ‘Initial Impact assessment’ and ‘Incident Cause’
fields are used to document any initial assessment of
how the incident has affected the organization and what
caused the incident to occur. However, the ISIR process
does not elaborate on what information should be
documented in these fields. The ‘Investigation Record’
field provides a space for the ISIR team to document and
record investigation proceedings as and when they
occur.
At the conclusion of an investigation, the incident
handlers can complete the remaining fields at the bottom
of Part C. The ‘Cost of Incident’ field can be used to
record the resources expended on an investigation,
while the ‘Conclusion’ field provides a space for the
incident handler to document concluding remarks from
the investigation. The final two fields ‘Post Incident
Lessons Learned’ and ‘Preventive Actions to be Taken’
are used to document and record any lessons learned
identified from the investigation, as well as any actions,
which need to be taken post-incident.

4. Data Collection and Analysis
Fifteen (15) semi-structured interviews were
conducted within the organization during the
exploratory case study. The interview sample consisted
of individuals in a variety of information security roles
including, information security managers, senior
Figure 1: ISIR Record Template

Page 7160

security analysts, and security analysts. The individuals
also indicated that they had a diverse range of work
experience within a technical role. The interviewees
have a minimum of two (2) years and a maximum of
thirty-nine (39) years experience. The mean average
experience of the interviewees was thirteen and a half
(13.5) years.
The analysis of the ISIR team database revealed that
one hundred and eighty-eight (188) security
investigations were recorded in the database, at the time
of the case study. The analysis of the investigation
records, coupled with the findings from the interviews,
are presented from the perspectives of data accuracy
within the records and the timeliness of information
available to the ISIR team. The records are also
examined from the standpoint of documented
information consistency and completeness.

4.1. Accuracy of Data
Regarding data accuracy, several observations
appeared during the investigation records analysis. The
first observation is related to the accuracy of date
information within the investigation record itself. The
‘Date’ field is initially available in Section A of the
record template, where the assumption is that the field
describes the reported date of a security incident to the
ISIR team. However, a ‘Date’ field is also present in
Section C of the record template, with no further
guidance on the purpose of this ‘Date’ information field.
There are several potential uses of this field including
the opening date for the investigation record, the
incident identification or discovery date, or the
implementation date of the first mitigation actions. As a
result of this ambiguity, there is the potential that the
information recorded in this ‘Date’ field is inaccurate.
The information documented in the field might not
represent the correct value that management expects
within the investigation record template. The problem is
inflated further due to a lack of document process
specificity regarding what date information should be
documented into the template.
A second observation related to the accuracy of data
is related to the ‘Incident Type’ field. The analysis of
the records revealed that the word ‘incident’ is prevalent
in the majority of the investigation records. This
strongly suggests that these records are considered by
the ISIR team to be ‘security incidents’. However, when
queried about this phenomenon during the interviews,
the participants indicated that a large number of the
records classified as ‘security incidents’ were not all
‘incidents’ but a combination of ‘security incidents’ and
‘security events’. It was interesting to observe that at the
time of the case study, no formal security incident
response categorization taxonomy existed within the

organization. Hence, there is the potential that the
number and type of incidents recorded as occurring
within the organization is imprecise information.
The results, of querying the interview participants as
to the meaning of the term ‘security incident’, supports
the idea that the classification of security incidents is
imprecise. A wide variety of answers were received,
which included: “breach of security policy”;
“degradation or circumvention of security controls”;
“data loss”; “financial losses” and “threat to service
availability”. The variety of answers received from this
query indicates that the organization does not have a
unified definition of the term ‘security incident’. The
consequence is that the ISIR team could find it difficult
to identify, generate and document accurate incident
category titles for security investigations occurring
within the organization.
A third observation concerning the accuracy of
information in the investigation record regards the
documentation of contact information. According to the
investigation record template, the ISIR team is expected
to use the fields within Section B of the template to
record contact information regarding the incident
handler assigned to the investigation. However, the
analysis of this information revealed that the contact
information for nearly half the records did not belong to
individuals handling the incident, but the individuals
who are reporting the incident to the ISIR team. It is
imperative to note that the documented process does not
specify what information should be recorded in the
template. However, this ambiguity has resulted in the
storage of inaccurate information in Section B of the
investigation record template. Documentation clarity
regarding the type of information to record in this
section would help the ISIR team to quickly identify
whom to contact for further details regarding specific
investigations. Hence, more precious and accurate
information could be recorded in the investigation
record.

4.2. Timeliness of Data
Time is a critical factor in many security incident
investigations [11, 16]. In some incidents, it could
become vital for security incident handlers to quickly
obtain access to data before it is overwritten or becomes
outdated. However, during the interviews, ten (10) out
of the fifteen (15) respondents suggested that the ISIR
team often encounters challenges related to the
timeliness of security data. As a result, some of this data
could be outdated, or it may differ from the original
value. A variety of challenges were described
preventing access to timely data including obstacles to
obtaining physical access to data, short data retention
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times, and limited support from third-parties involved in
the incident investigation.
West-Brown et al. [38] argue that metrics provide an
accurate way of quantifying the performance of security
incident response teams. West-Brown et al. [38] defined
response time as the period from the first report of a
security incident to the implementation of the first
mitigating actions. They describe the total time to
resolve an incident as the time from when the security
incident is reported to the time the incident is closed. It
is interesting that West-Brown et al. [38] note that
although such information is useful to analyze the
historical performance of a security incident response
team, there are no published recommended times to
evaluate such groups. However, the information
recorded in the investigation records can be useful to
determine and identify potential challenges to obtaining
timely information during security incident
investigations.
Fifty-two (52) incident records contained data
concerning the response time. The minimum response
time calculated from these records was two minutes and
the maximum response time was 325 minutes. The
average response time was 56.30 minutes. Figure 2 –
Cumulative Response Times presents the percentage of
incidents which were responded to over a given period
of time. As shown in Figure 2, the ISIR team takes
mitigating actions within thirty minutes for
approximately sixty percent (60%) of the recorded
security incidents and within two hours for ninety
percent (90%) of the incidents.

Figure 2: Cumulative Response Times
Sixty-two (62) of the incident records contain data
concerning the total time to resolution; meaning that
there were one-hundred and twenty-six (126) incidents
that did not include enough information for this
calculation. Out of the sixty-two (62), the minimum
time to resolve an incident was half a day and the
maximum time to address an incident was one-hundred
and thirty (130) days. Therefore, the average time to
address an incident was just under 12 days. Figure 3 –
Cumulative Total Time to Resolve Incidents presents

the percentage of incidents that were resolved from the
first reporting to closure over a given period.
The ISIR team resolves twenty percent (20%) of the
analyzed incidents in half a day, and eighty percent
(80%) of the analyzed incidents are resolved within
twenty days (20). In summary, the response and total
time to resolve calculations support the idea that some
of the investigation data being collected by the ISIR
team could be either outdated or unavailable because of
challenges preventing access to timely data.

Figure 3: Cumulative Total Time to Resolve
Incidents

4.3. Completeness of Data
The completeness analysis focuses on the number of
fields within the investigation record that are completed
during the documentation of a security investigation. At
a high-level, this analysis shows that only one field, the
‘Investigation Record’ field, was considered complete
in the one hundred and eighty-eight (188) investigation
records. For this analysis, a field is considered complete
if data is visible in the field, regardless of its accuracy
dimension.
A further seven (7) out of the twenty-two (22) fields
were completed in at least ninety-four percent (94%) of
the investigation records. In contrast, the ‘Duration’ and
‘Cost of Incident’ fields were only completed in thirteen
percent (13%) of the investigation records. Moreover,
fifty (50) investigation records (27%) contained
information within the ‘Post-Incident Lessons Learned’
field, and only twenty-eight (28) records or fifteen
percent (15%) provide information within the
‘Preventive Actions’ field. Hence, nearly three-quarters
of the investigation records did not contain lessons
learned regarding the security investigation. Table 1 –
Number of Completed Fields summarizes the number
and percentage of completed fields within the ISIR team
database.
From an overall investigation record perspective,
only one (1) out of the one hundred and eighty-eight
(188) records analyzed during the study were considered
completed, from the perspective of all twenty-two (22)
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fields. This means that one hundred and eighty-seven
(187) records contained one or more fields that were
incomplete, regarding information in the documented
security investigation. Fifteen (15) investigation records
were found to be missing between one and three fields;
forty-one (41) records were found to be missing four to
six fields, while one hundred and seventeen (117)
records were missing seven to ten fields of information.
Furthermore, fourteen (14) records were missing
information within eleven (11) or more fields in the
investigation record template. This finding suggests that
the incident handlers are not completing the entire
incident record during incident investigations within the
organization.

Field Name
Date
Time
Duration
Name
Job Title
Department
Location
Telephone
Mobile
Email
Fax
Date
Time
Incident Type
Incident Location
Initial Impact Assessment
Incident Cause
Investigation Record
Cost of Incident
Conclusion
Post-Incident Lessons Learned
Preventative Actions to Be Taken

No. of
Records (%
of Overall)
181 (96%)
176 (94%)
24 (13%)
186 (99%)
185 (98%)
184 (98%)
180 (96%)
180 (96%)
62 (33%)
164 (87%)
39 (21%)
178 (95%)
167 (89%)
145 (77%)
97 (52%)
68 (36%)
155 (82%)
188 (100%)
25 (13%)
54 (29%)
50 (27%)
28 (15%)

Table 1: Number of Completed Fields
To explore why incomplete information was
recorded in the investigation records, the interview
participants were queried to determine if and when data
is collected regarding a security investigation. The
majority of the answers returned were positive. Fourteen
(14) out of the fifteen (15) respondents suggested that
data is collected and stored throughout the
organization’s security incident response lifecycle.
However, one individual indicated that he/she did not
know if the practice took place. The respondents did
indicate that investigation information was assigned and
performed by an incident handler that has been

designated as the primary incident handler and it was the
responsibility of this individual to ensure that
information was documented.
When the individuals were asked about what
information is documented within the records, this
information included investigation meeting notes,
actions to be taken for remediation, copies of any logs
and emails associated with the investigation, as well as
communication between the ISIR team and
management. However, information related to the
individual fields within the investigation record
template were not mentioned by the respondents. This
suggests that the organization does not have a uniform
approach to capturing specific information and that the
information captured focuses on assisting with the
eradication and recovery aspect of the lifecycle.
However, this approach potentially hinders capturing
actionable information that could facilitate meaningful
threat intelligence for future use.

4.4. Consistency of Data
Regarding consistency, the analysis focused on the
information recorded within the individual fields in the
investigation record template. Several observations
were evident in this analysis. The first observation was
related to the representation of date and time
information within the investigation records. In both
cases, the document analysis revealed that incident
handlers are not provided guidance on a standard format
to document these two metrics. As a result, dates and
times are stored in different formats. For example, date
information was found to be in the following formats:
DD/MM/YY, DD/MM/YYYY, DD/MM, and MM/DD.
Similar observations were noticed with time
information, which was documented in both 12-hour
and 24-hour formats. Moreover, in some cases, it was
difficult to distinguish what time format was actually
being used by the incident handler.
The second observation regarding consistency is
related to the ‘Incident Type’ field, and the inconsistent
information used to describe an incident. For example,
an investigation where potential data loss has been an
issue, the following information was found to be
recorded in the ‘Incident Type’ field’: ‘potential data
exposure’, ‘potential data leakage’, ‘potential security
breach’, ‘exposure of live data’, ‘email to the wrong
person’, and ‘loss of data’. This finding reiterates the
lack of a consistent security incident response
categorization taxonomy within the organization.
However, it also revealed that two investigation records
of the same type, can potentially, be described with
different incident type descriptions. This could
complicate the identification of indicators of
compromise later in the intelligence process.
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One potential explanation regarding the
inconsistency of data recorded in the investigation
record could be the limited resources available to the
ISIR team. While twelve (12) out of the fifteen (15)
individuals confirmed that the organization uses a
document-centric security incident response approach,
five (5) people suggested that the process is not always
followed. When questioned as to the reasons for process
deviation, answers comprised of time constraints, a lack
of staff to run the entire process, and a lack of support
for handling specific security investigations. Hence, the
findings suggest that there is a potential link between the
quality of consistent information documented in the
incident investigation record and the resources available
to the ISIR team.

5. Conclusions and Future Work
Security incidents are increasingly impacting
industries in today’s globally networked environments.
As a result, organizations are exploring alternative
security measures, such as security threat intelligence
programs. However, for such a program to be a success,
organizations need to ensure that all viable data is
collected, validated, and recorded into relevant
datastores, to support an overall security threat
intelligence effort. Security incident response
investigations are no exception to these requirements.
Any data collected during the course of an investigation
that is translated into actionable information will have a
direct impact on the viability of derived intelligence.
Empirical analysis of the security incident response
landscape in a Fortune 500 Financial organization
revealed that the quality of data generated during the
security incident response lifecycle needs to be
addressed. The results from the case study suggest that
the data currently generated from the organization’s
security incident response process does not appear to
help facilitate security threat intelligence, either during
or after the closure of an investigation. A message that
emerges from this research is that other organizations,
similar to the organization in this exploratory case study,
need to examine the quality of data generated during and
after their security incident investigations. It is plausible
that other organizations could also have data quality
issues in their security incident response lifecycle.
Several opportunities exist for future research. One
area of future research will identify, investigate and
evaluate methods, tools, and techniques that can be used
to enhance the quality of data generated during and after
security investigations. One potential avenue could
involve the integration of disciplined agile principles
and practices into the security incident response process
as a viable method of strengthening an organization’s

security incident response data quality proficiencies.
Another potential area of research is to explore
automated approaches for reducing data quality issues
during a security incident response investigation.
Additional areas of research also include investigating
the optimal data capture automation and the overall
impact of this automation throughout all the phases of a
security incident investigation. This research would
include the examination of methods and tools to
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of data
generation and collection within security incident
response teams. Future research will repeat and expand
the existing case study in similar and other organizations
and industry sectors. The objective of the expansion is
to determine the generalizability and transferability of
the data quality issues identified in this case study with
respect to other industries.
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